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SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
ARTICLE 82: GESTALT, MYTHS, QUESTIONS
Reza Dibadjt
Abstract
Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community is
the counterpart to the anti-monopolization provisions contained in
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Commentators have criticized recent
applications of Article 82 as outdated, protectionist, inconsistent -
and perhaps most damaging of all, based on faulty economics. This
paper takes issue with these critiques to offer support for a robust
Article 82. An appreciation for Article 82 can only emerge through a
contextual analysis of its historical origins and its regulatory role
within a broader policy of European economic integration.
In developing its argument, the paper explores two common
myths. The first is that Article 82 pits innovative American businesses
against bureaucratic European regulators. The reality, however, is
quite different: faced with lax antitrust enforcement at home,
American competitors have found it necessary to turn to Europe for
redress against monopolistic abuses. The second is that antitrust
should espouse a laissez-faire approach toward dominant firms - a
mentality that has most prominently led to anemic interpretations of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
In recent months Europe has begun to fall under the spell of
laissez-faire rhetoric as it explores reinterpreting Article 82 to mimic
Section 2. This paper concludes by arguing that these new
developments, while troublesome, provide a window to debate three
basic sets of questions. First, what interests desire a weakening of the
law of abuse and dominant position? Second, can Section 2 learn
from Article 82, rather than the other way around? Third, and most
fundamentally, can Article 82 provide insight into a broader
discussion about the goals and methods of antitrust?
t Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I thank the editors of the
Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in the
Journal's "Cross-Border Legal Challenges" Symposium in San Jose, California on January 26,
2007.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
which prohibits "abuse ... of a dominant position,"' is the
counterpart to the anti-monopolization provisions contained in
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 While Section 2 enforcement has been
quiescent for over two decades, Article 82 can present a minefield for
American multinationals in Europe3-to wit, high profile examples of
companies that have come under European scrutiny include IBM,
4
Coca-Cola,5 Microsoft,6 Intel, 7 and Apple.
8
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, Feb. 7, 1992, 2006 O.J. (C
321 E) 74 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty].
2. Section 2 reads in it entirety:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or
by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
direction of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Barbara Cmtchfield George et al., Increasing Extraterritorial Intrusion of
European Union Authority Into U.S. Business Mergers and Competition Practices: U.S.
Multinational Businesses Underestimate the Strength of the European Commission from G.E.-
Honeywell to Microsoft, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 571 (2004). Cf Spencer Weber Waller,
Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition Law, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 68 (1992)
("While the jurisprudence of Article 86 [82] is not as well developed as Article 85 [81], the
Commission devotes substantial resources to its enforcement, especially in comparison to the
dormancy of govemment enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States.").
4. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and
the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 981,
1013-15 (1986) [hereinafter Fox, Monopolization and Dominance].
5. See, e.g., Commission Decision 2005/670, Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, 2005 O.J. (L 253) 21.
6. See, e.g., Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), COM (2004) 900 final (Apr. 21, 2004) [hereinafter
Microsoft Decision]; Tobias Buck, EU Regulator to Keep A Watchful Eye on New Operating
System, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at 24; Paul Meller, Europe Is Expected to Fine Microsoft
Hundreds of Millions, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at C3; Jonathan Krim, Microsoft and the Big
Pond: Case May Spotlight U.S.-EU Antitrust Rift, WASH. POST, May 17, 2002, at El.
7. See, e.g., Dean Takahashi, EU May File Antitrust Lawsuit Against Intel, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 5, 2006, at IC; Jack Ewing, EU Ready to Pounce on Intel?, BUS. WK.
ONLINE, Oct. 4, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/oct2006/gb20061004_981978.htm?campaign_i
d=tbw.
8. The Apple case is somewhat different in that the controversies have occurred at the
national, not EU, level and has focused on copyright law, rather than antitrust qua antitrust. See,
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The fact that these companies have not faced comparable
scrutiny in the United States under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is
symptomatic of what has emerged as a transatlantic dissidence as to
the dangers of monopoly. Interpretative differences between
monopolization" in the U.S. and "abuse of dominance" in the EU are
"now the area[s] of greatest divergence between competition policies
of the United States and Europe." 9 Judge Diane Wood has even called
this divergence "the single most problematic one that exists"' 0 in
transnational antitrust.
Unfortunately, Article 82 has become a convenient punching bag
in a lopsided debate. It is popular today to argue that the current
American perspective on monopoly is inherently superior. When
discussing the European approach to dominant firms, some critics
bemoan a "form-based approach that too easily assumes the existence
of [anticompetitive] effects"11-a regime where rules against
dominant companies have been applied "too rigidly and too
aggressively."' 2 Others variously lament that "Article 82 of the EC
Treaty is being used more as an adjunct to industrial policy than as a
e.g., Thomas Crampton, Key Parts of "iPod Law" Struck Down in France, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 12, 2006, at 13, available at
http://www.iht.com/bin/print ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/07/28/yourmroney/music.php; Ivar
Ekman, Politicians Smell Votes in Sweden's File-Sharing Debate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jun. 19,
2006, at 11. There are, however, broader implications for European competition law. See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Hazlett, Antitrust Regulators Must Listen to Reason on iPods, FIN. TIMES, July 12,
2006, at 15; Kevin Allison & Tom Braithwaite, Crunch Time for Apple's Music Icon, FIN.
TIMES, Jun. 14, 2006, at 27.
9. William J. Kolasky, What Is Competition? A Comparison of the U.S. and European
Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 40 (2004) [hereinafter Kolasky, What Is Competition?].
10. Diane P. Wood, The U.S. Antitrust Laws in a Global Context, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L.
REv. 265, 272 (2004) [hereinafter Wood, U.S. Antitrust Laws]. See also Roger Parloff, Intel's
Worst Nightmare, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 64 ("For while there is wide consensus among
antitrust experts about the harmfulness and, consequently, illegality of collusive activity among
competitors---e.g., cartelization, bid-rigging, price-fixing-there is no comparable agreement
about conduct by one very big competitor acting alone."); Kolasky, What Is Competition?,
supra note 9, at 37 ("The number one priority of any competition law regime should be vigorous
anticartel enforcement.").
11. Lars-Hendrik Roeller & Oliver Stehmann, The Year 2005 at DG Competition. The
Trend Towards a More Effects-Based Approach, 29 REv. INDUS. ORG. 281, 286 (2006). See
also Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919,
919 (2005) ("[Tjbe prohibition of abuse of a dominant position still remains the major source of
suspense in EC competition law enforcement."); Christian Ahlbom et al., DG Comp's
Discussion Paper on Article 82: Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules
for Dynamically Competitive Industries (Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract894466.
12. Editorial, A Competition Policy Overdue for Review: Obstacles to Rethinking the EU
Line on Dominant Companies, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at 22.
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pure competition law tool,' 13 that the "[European] Commission has
been more interested in controlling large companies than with
curtailing actual monopoly power," 14 and that the abuse of dominant
position is a concept "too vague and potentially too restrictive."'' 5
Indeed, Article 82 has emerged as a pitiful poster child for a European
competition policy that is pejoratively described as "legalistic"' 16 and
characterized by "the absence of economic considerations."' 7 As a
sign of the times, think tanks publish articles disparagingly titled
"Europe: Global Antitrust Policeman?"'
' 8
This paper takes issue with this overwhelming mass of criticism
to offer support for Article 82. In marked contrast to the prevailing
wisdom that strongly urges that the Europeans should adopt the
contemporary American approach to monopolization, this paper
suggests precisely the opposite: that Article 82 not only offers some
lessons for Section 2, but also provides insight into a broader
discussion about what antitrust law should be.
The argument is divided into three principal sections. Section II
suggests that narrow analyses focused on the provision's language or
specific judicial decisions offer little insight. Rather, an appreciation
for Article 82 can only emerge through a richer contextual analysis of
its historical origins and its regulatory role within a broader policy of
European economic integration.
Building upon this framework, Section III attempts to debunk
two common myths. The first is that Article 82 pits innovative
American businesses against bureaucratic European regulators. The
reality, however, is quite different: faced with lax antitrust
enforcement at home, American competitors have found it necessary
to turn to Europe for redress against monopolistic abuses. A second
misperception is that antitrust policy should espouse a laissez-faire
13. Forrester, supra note 11, at 920.
14. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, European Union Competition Law and Policy:
How Much Latitude for Convergence with the United States?, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 727, 759
(2003).
15. David J. Gerber, Competition Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.) (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-871710.
16. Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU-
Converging or Diverging Paths?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 11 (2004).
17. Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in
Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 522
(2003).
18. See John S. Gardner, Europe: The Global Antitrust Policeman?, 2006 AM. LEGIS.
EXCHANGE COUNCIL 1, available at www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/0607.pdf.
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approach toward dominant firms-a mentality that has most
prominently led to anemic interpretations of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. This so-called "economic" approach, however, is based on the
faulty premises of Chicago School economics that, among other ills,
misdefines "consumer welfare," overplays contestability theory, and
ignores core theory. It also slights path dependence, network effects,
and the anticompetitive dangers of overbroad intellectual property
rights.
Finally, Section IV begins by outlining how in recent months
Europe has begun to fall under the spell of laissez-faire rhetoric as it
explores reinterpreting Article 82 to mimic Section 2. The paper
concludes by arguing that these new developments, while
troublesome, provide a window to debate three basic sets of
questions. First, what interests desire a weakening of the law of abuse
of dominant position? Second, can Section 2 learn from Article 82,
rather than the other way around? Third, and most fundamentally, can
Article 82 provide insight into a broader discussion about the goals
and methods of antitrust?
II. GESTALT
Several paths might offer insight into Article 82. One might
begin by looking at its text. The Article states that "[a]ny abuse by
one of more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States." 19 It then continues by offering four examples of
offensive activities. 20 While more detailed than Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,2 1 Article 82 similarly uses "open-textured ' 22 and "broad
19. Consolidated EC Treaty art. 82 (emphasis added).
20. The illustrations are as follows:
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id.
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 770.
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and non-specific ' 23 language that provides little guidance. If anything,
Section 2 is more ambitious in proscribing "attempt to monopolize"
24
and imposing criminal penalties-neither of which Article 82
provides for. 25 To boot, one might plausibly argue that Article 82,
unlike Section 2, does not prohibit a "dominant position" per se, but
only its abuse.26 Quite ironically, then, the European language appears
less ambitious than the American one. Put bluntly, textual analysis
provides little insight as to why Article 82 has been enforced more
vigorously than its American counterpart.
27
23. Jason M. Sullivan, Note, European Antitrust Enforcement: A Distinct Prosecution or
a More Principled Approach?, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 457, 467 (2006).
24. See supra note 2.
25. See, e.g., BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 680 (Law & Business, Inc. 1981)
("Article 86 [82], unlike section 2, does not include an attempt and conspiracy to monopolize. In
this respect, Article 86 [82] is narrower in scope than section 2, for its application is conditioned
on the finding of an already existing 'dominant position,' while section 2 reaches attempts or
conspiracies to attain monopoly power."); Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 576 ("Where the EC
finds an infringement of Article 82, the only sanctions available are orders requiring the
undertaking to cease the infringing action, fines and penalties."). In addition, unlike the
European regime, § 4 of the Clayton Act provides for treble damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15
(2000).
26. As one commentator observes:
[D]ominance in Community law is not the same as "monopoly" in United States
antitrust law.... The mere existence of the power to exclude competition,
without its exercise, is lawful under Community law.... But, once dominant, a
firm may not use unlawful methods to maintain, consolidate or strengthen its
dominance. It is not absence of competition, but taking advantage of it or
imposing further restrictions on competition which is unlawful.
John Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community
Antitrust Law, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 1, 13 (1980). See also Sullivan, supra note 23, at 467
("One of the key aspects of Article 82 is that a dominant position alone is not a per se violation
of the competition law."); Kim H. Jordan, Essay, International Application of a Domestic
Intellectual Property Protection Strategy: Extending a Predatory Litigation Strategy to the
European Community, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 373, 395 (1995). Cf
Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 742-43.
27. For example, criminal sanctions for violations of Section 2 are unheard of today. See,
e.g., William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31
CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1292 (1999) [hereinafter Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies]
("Although the Sherman Act treats Section 2 offenses as crimes, few cases alleging single-firm
misconduct (as opposed to conspiracies to monopolize) have pressed criminal charges against
dominant firms, and none have done so since 1940."). Interestingly, some observers suggest that
the ambition of the text may be inversely related to the vigor of its enforcement. See, e.g.,
Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems
of Belief About Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343, 354 (2004) ("The remedy for
infringement-treble damages or even a criminal prosecution-may have also encouraged a
narrower interpretation of the antitrust laws [in the U.S.]."); Lang, supra note 26, at 49 ("[1]n the
United States monopoly power, not merely its abuse, may be unlawful. In the EEC, monopoly
power is clearly lawful, and therefore the need to prevent its exploitation is greater than in the
United States.").
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Perhaps case law might offer a more useful perspective. While
not as rich as Article 81 jurisprudence, there is significant body of
Article 82 caselaw dating back to the early 1970s. 2 8 And overall, a
pattern does emerge: European courts have defined "abuse of
dominance" less stringently than American courts have defined
"monopolization. '' 29 Relatedly, the Europeans have used Article 82 to
combat discriminatory pricing,30 loyalty rebates, 31 and refusals to
supply. 32 In doing so, Article 82 jurisprudence has diverged from that
of Section 2.
But the caselaw unfortunately does not provide a basic
framework from which to make sense of transatlantic differences.
Fundamental principles are vaguely articulated. For example, the
canonical definition of "dominant position" in European caselaw is:
"a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the
relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable
28. For a succinct overview of cases on abuse of dominant position, see Microsoft
Decision, supra note 6, 542-559. For a more detailed historical analysis, see HAWK, supra
note 25. See also Damien Geradin et al., The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law
(July 2005) (unpublished research paper, College of Europe), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-770144.
29. See, e.g., HAWK, supra note 25, at 680.
30. See, e.g., Gal, supra note 27, at 345 ("U.S. antitrust law sets a straightforward rule:
monopoly pricing, as such, is not regulated. In contrast, under European Community (EC) law
excessive pricing is considered an abuse of dominance and is punishable by fine and subject to a
prohibitory order."); Waller, supra note 3, at 70 ("Article 86 [82] has been applied extensively
to the pricing policies of dominant firms.").
31. See, e.g., Waller, supra note 3, at 71 ("Highly discretionary year end rebate systems
that create disincentives to change suppliers have been held to constitute an abuse of a dominant
position."); Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 7.
32. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 1, 23 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Toward World Antitrust] ("There is a significant gap
between the United States' strong principle that even monopoly firms have the right to refuse to
deal except under narrowly defined circumstances, and the European Union's capacious
principle of dominant firms' duties not to discriminate, refuse to deal, or unfairly exclude.");
Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What Can the EU Learn
from the U.S. Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and
Deutsche Telekom?, 18 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=617263.
In particular, the use of the essential facilities doctrine to combat refusals to deal has become a
vibrant area of debate. See, e.g., Sebastien J. Evrard, Essential Facilities in the European Union:
Bronner and Beyond, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 491 (2004); Donna M. Gitter, The Conflict in the
European Community between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights. A Call for
Legislative Clarification of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 217 (2003);
Mercer H. Harz, Comment, Dominance and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through
Microsoft Windows at the Essential Facilities Doctrine, II EMORY INT'L L. REv. 189 (1997).
33. See, e.g., Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 549-64; HAWK, supra note 25, 723-57.
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extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately
of the consumers., 34 In turn, "abuse" of such a position is
an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in
a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a
market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking,
the degree of competition is weakened and which, through
recourse to methods different from those which condition normal
competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions
of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the
market or the growth of that competition.
35
While perhaps displaying a certain rhetorical elegance, these
articulations - much like the American definition of
"monopolization" 36 
- offer precious little guidance as to how a court
might rule in one case versus another. Case outcomes are highly fact-
dependent 37 and often feature ambiguous rhetoric.38 Unfortunately
then, "[t]he legal definition of dominance and monopoly power -
34. Case 85/76, Hoffmnann-LaRoche & Co. AG v. Comm'n, 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 38 (1979).
See also Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm'n of the European Comys, 1978 E.C.R. 207,
65.
35. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 91. See also Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh
Foods Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-4653, 157; Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar PLC v.
Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969, 111.
36. The definition provided in United States. v. Grinnell remains canonical:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
37. See Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 521 ("[T]he economics of monopolization cases
are complex, sometimes controversial, and highly fact-driven.").
38. For example, in Irish Sugar, the European Court of First Instance holds that
[W]hilst the finding that a dominant position exists does not in itself imply any
reproach to the undertaking concerned, it has a special responsibility, irrespective
of the causes of that position, not to allow its conduct to impair genuine
undistorted competition on the common market. Similarly, whilst the fact that an
undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its entitlement to
protect its own commercial interests when they are attacked, and whilst such an
undertaking must be allowed the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems
appropriate to protect those interests, such behaviour cannot be allowed if its
purpose is to strengthen that dominant position and thereby abuse it.
Irish Sugar, Case T-228/97, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2969, 112 (citations omitted). Of course, drawing
the line between the protection of the dominant firm's commercial interests and distorting
competition is left as an exercise to the reader.
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that is the ability to exclude competitors or to act independently of
competitors and customers - is also of limited use.
39
If analysis of the text and its interpretative caselaw does not
yield clues as to what might explain Article 82's vitality, perhaps one
might look to its history and context. Specifically, the European
approach to dominant firms might be usefully understood based on
two factors: its historic roots in Austrian and German deliberations
about market regulation and its role as an instrument of European
market integration.
First, a bit of history. As David Gerber has argued, European
distrust of dominant enterprises has its roots in the intellectual foment
of late nineteenth century Austria. Austrian intellectuals believed in
the need to establish a separate legal system to punish anticompetitive
behavior:
The Austrian proposals and debates provided not only a framework
for analysis of the problem of economic competition, but also a
model for responding to that problem. The starting point of this
response has been the belief that the objective of protecting
competition has little to do with the traditional goals and methods
of civil and criminal law. It thus requires a legal regime
specifically adapted to achieving that objective. This has precluded
reliance on the procedures of the ordinary courts and required a
fundamentally different procedural framework for competition
law. This view of competition law contrasts sharply with the
tendency in U.S. antitrust law to employ the existing conceptual
and procedural molds of criminal and civil law to deal with
competition law issues.
40
Crucially, the Austrians believed that American overemphasis on
cartel-busting had led to the emergence of dangerous monopolies in
the form of trusts. As Gerber recounts, the Austrians believed that
"the lack of flexibility and cumbersomeness of the U.S. treatment of
cartels as well as its reliance on the regular court system were thought
to have encouraged the formation of trusts and thus to have increased
economic concentration. The Austrians feared such concentration far
39. Kolasky, What Is Competition?, supra note 9, at 43. See also Gifford & Kudrle, supra
note 14, at 728 ("[C]ompetition-law rhetoric is often deeply ambiguous."). Cf Sullivan, supra
note 23, at 469 ("Although they do not appear in exactly the same form, the substantive laws
applied to Microsoft's actions by the EU and the United States are very much the same, or at
least not so different as to explain the potential discrepancies in the outcomes of the two
cases.").
40. David J. Gerber, The Origins of European Competition Law in Fin-de-Siecle Austria,
36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 439 (1992).
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more than cartels.' 41 Thus already we see an important precursor to
EU competition law that recognizes the dangers of monopoly and
grapples with antitrust law as a regulatory problem meriting a
separate institutional framework.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Austrian debate
was joined with German Ordo-Liberalism. As Gerber puts it:
The Ordo-Liberals believed that socialism and classical
laissez-faire economics had been discredited, respectively, by the
rise of authoritarianism and by the Great Depression. They
developed, therefore, a set of ideas about the relationship between
political and economic institutions which combined classical
laissez-faire economics with concepts of state intervention.
One of the central components of the Ordo-Liberal program
was the idea that where competition was weak or non-existent, the
state should require enterprises to conduct themselves as if there
• .. 42
were essentially perfect competition.
Thus, Ordo-Liberals sought to move away from the problems
wrought by nineteenth century liberalism:
Ordoliberal ideology stressed the need for an economic
constitution that would limit the convergence of private economic
power in the interest of a free and fair political and social order. To
achieve this goal, it posited the need to regulate the conduct of
dominant firms by requiring them to act in a manner consistent
with a competitive economic model.
43
Crucially, ordo-liberalism postulated "that competitive rivalry
should be protected as such." 44 Ordo-Liberalism's distaste for
monopoly and desire to encourage rivalry thus provides at least a
partial explanation for why Europeans interpret Article 82 in a
manner that, to contemporary American tastes, might seem too
protective of competitors.45
41. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
42. David J. Gerber, Law and the Abuse of Economic Power in Europe, 62 TUL. L. REV.
57, 69-70 (1988) [hereinafter Gerber, Economic Power] (second emphasis added).
43. Gal, supra note 27, at 364. See also Gerber, Economic Power, supra note 42, at 69
n.63 ("In their [Ordo-Liberal] view, history had demonstrated that without government
intervention competitive processes tended to collapse, because enterprises preferred private (i.e.,
contractual) regulation of business activities rather than competition, and because market-
dominating enterprises often acquired such power that they were not affected by competitive
pressures. Thus, the state had to enforce competition.").
44. Ahlborn et al., supra note 11, at 27 (emphasis added).
45. See Gal, supra note 27, at 364 ("At its inception and during the first two decades of
its application, the Treaty of Rome was strongly influenced by the Ordoliberal ideology
[Vol. 23
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The intersection between market integration and competition law
provides the second piece of the interpretive puzzle. Article 82 is but
one small part of a very ambitious treaty that seeks to establish "a
common market and an economic and monetary union ....,, In
implementing this goal, Article 3(g) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community provides that the Community will include "a
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not
distorted. '' 7 As two commentators observe, in Europe "the behavior
of dominant undertakings is analyzed with respect to a broader range
of concerns.... The concerns encompass such broad, although not
always explicit, goals as establishing a common market, promoting
harmonious development and economic expansion, increasing living
standards, and bringing about closer relationships between EU
Member States. '48
developed by the Freiburg School of German academics before and immediately after the
Second World War.").
46. Consolidated EC Treaty art. 2. Indeed, the use of competition policy to integrate
European markets predates the Treaty of Rome. In language similar to that later appearing in
Article 82, the 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
empowered the High Authority (predecessor to the European Commission):
[To address to] public or private undertakings which, in law or in fact, hold or
acquire in the market for one of the products within its jurisdiction a dominant
position shielding them against effective competition in a substantial part of the
common market.., such recommendations as may be appropriate to prevent the
position from being so used.
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 66(7), Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140. See also id art. 65 (prohibiting activities "tending directly or indirectly to
prevent, restrict or distort normal competition within the common market ...."). See also
Gerber, Economic Power, supra note 42, at 86; Christopher Bellamy, Focusing on the European
Perspective of Judicial Dialogue: Issues in the Area of Competition Law, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J.
461, 462 (2004). Some commentators suggest, somewhat ironically, that the U.S. encouraged
insertion of Articles 65 and 66. See, e.g., Christopher Bellamy, The U.S. and the EU: Some
Reflections on Competition Law in the Global Market, 34 NEw ENG. L. REv. 15, 16 (2000)
[hereinafter Bellamy, U.S. and the EU]. The U.S., of course, has a different attitude to antitrust
in the 1950s and 60s. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
47. Consolidated EC Treaty art. 3(g). See also James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the
Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 352 (1996) ("In the EU, antitrust is part of the web of a complicated
political instrument, a treaty; the warp of that treaty involves other considerations of industrial
and political policy .... ); Gal, supra note 27, at 362.
48. Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertakings: The
Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 443,
449 (1996). See also Forrester, supra note I1, at 929 ("The analysis of many competition
questions in Europe is distorted by the unique significance attached to market integration under
our competition law. Pursuing the civil religion by honoring cross-border trade more than other
economic activity is a well-established phenomenon."); Lang, supra note 26, at 26.
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As if the objective were not aspiring enough, the starting point
for Europe has been a challenging one. European economies after
World War II hardly exhibited competitive vigor. By the 1950s
[t]he six original members of the European Community [West
Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands] all
had strong protectionist and prescriptive traditions. These member
states were much less skeptical than the U.S. about the efficiency
of direct regulation of the market. In fact, Germany, which had the
strongest antitrust tradition of the six signatories, prohibited the
earning of "monopoly rents." It might also be that rampant
inflation after World War II experienced by many European
countries naturally led to a strong interest in an economic policy
that ensured lower prices. The fact that many dominant firms were
created, controlled or protected by national governments might
also have played a role, as such monopolies were not likely to be
eliminated by market forces.
49
Dismantling these traditions has, to say the least, been neither a
straightforward nor expeditious task. Decades later, "EC competition
authorities, unlike their U.S. counterparts, face the challenge of
attaining a single market for products and services in a region where
there are many dominant positions and numerous sectors where
markets are regional., 50 Examples might include policing traditional
national monopolies, 5' ensuring that multinational firms "deal in fair
and nondiscriminatory ways with their local distributors, 52  or
"reducing significant price disparities among consumers in different
member states. 53
More generally, European competition law is not just about the
microeconomics of industrial organization, but fulfills a function
within macroeconomic trade policy. As one European jurist suggests,
49. Gal, supra note 27, at 361. See also Waller, supra note 3, at 57 ("EC competition law
represents a model which integrates competition principles into the broader traditions of a social
market economy in which governments intervene more frequently and more directly in
economic and social issues.").
50. Gitter, supra note 32, at 297.
51. See, e.g., Kolasky, What Is Competition?, supra note 9, at 41 ("In Europe, national
markets were formerly protected by internal trade barriers, resulting in more local monopolies,
and many more government-owned monopolies. As a result, there may be more undertakings
with dominant positions that are not the natural result of market dynamics that exist in the
United States."); Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 32, at 7 ("Established firms in
Germany, Belgium, France and other nations erected border barriers in markets for sugar,
quinine, dyestuffs and cement to prevent market liberalization from eroding their historic
national monopolies."); Roeller & Stehmann, supra note 11, at 292.
52. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 753.
53. Gal, supra note 27, at 362. See also HAWK, supra note 25, at 721.
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"[t]he basic idea behind articles 85 [81] and 86 [82] was that if you
are to dismantle barriers between states within a common market,
both tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers, you cannot risk having
those barriers re-erected by private agreements or abuses of monopoly
by private parties."
54
An appreciation for Article 82 can thus only emerge if one is
willing to go beyond a narrow analysis of its text and caselaw.55
When comparing attitudes toward monopoly on either side of the
Atlantic, "[s]uperficially similar provisions may mask highly
contradictory policy goals and widely differing procedural
assumptions. 6 Indeed, being too literal can be deeply misleading. As
Eleanor Fox observes:
[D]isparate antitrust treatment, where it occurs, normally results
not from different formulations of the principles but from the
different meanings given to specific key words-particularly,
"anticompetitive" and "abuse"--and different methodologies for
defining markets and assessing market power. These differences in
treatment are not apparent in the literal words of the antitrust
rules; the rules could have exactly the same wording and the
differences would persist. The persistent differences tend to be
based on matters of principle ....
This divergence does not imply that one set of attitudes is
necessarily always right or wrong; rather, it reflects a different set of
concerns and attitudes toward monopoly. Put simply, Article 82's
gestalt is different than that of Section 2.
54. Bellamy, U.S. and the EU, supra note 46, at 16-17. See also Waller, supra note 3, at
55 ("EC competition law must be understood in the context of the need to break down the
national boundaries between member states of the EC and to complete the unification of the
common market."); Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 527 ("[l]t is apparent that competition law
in the European Union also rests upon a desire for market integration, which is related to the
principle of free movement of goods and services across Member State lines.").
55. Cf Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 25 ("More importantly, [European competition
law] reflects different objectives, such as those of the establishment of a European common
market and of fairness."); Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 48, at 446 ("Articles 85 [81] and 86 [82]
of the Treaty of Rome, which are the primary articles governing European competition-i.e.,
antitrust-law, are not only concerned with competition matters, but are also seeking to
implement a broader range of industrial, social, and political policies.").
56. Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 48, at 445.
57. Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 32, at 16 (emphasis added).
58. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and
Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1781, 1798 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory
Federalism] ("European competition law is based on an eclectic set of objectives: to integrate
the common market, to protect firms from abusive domination, to provide openness and access,
to level the playing field, to foster efficiency and competitiveness, and to serve citizens as
consumers."). Cf Bellamy, US. and the EU, supra note 46, at 16 ("[lI]t is extremely difficult to
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III. MYTHS
Even with an appreciation for Article 82's history and context,
some might still argue that it makes for poor public policy fifty years
after the Treaty of Rome was signed. This contention typically rests
on two superficially appealing narratives: first, that Article 82 is too
often a protectionist measure implemented by European bureaucrats
against innovative American companies; second, that its use reflects
weak economics. Unfortunately for their proponents, these stories are
myths.
The first charge is straightforward to debunk. Even a casual
glance at European proceedings reveals a plain fact: American
companies are turning to Europe to address their antitrust concerns. A
few examples should illustrate the point. Sun Microsystems initiated
the epic Microsoft proceedings. 59 Similarly, Advanced Micro Devices
("AMD") raised its concerns about Intel in Europe after being
rebuffed by the FTC.60 Another American company, NDC, has
spearheaded the IMS litigation through its German subsidiary. 6 1 In
addition to their direct involvement, American firms have participated
in European proceedings indirectly through associations fighting
dominant firms.62 As one business journalist sums it up, "[t]he
European Union is increasingly becoming the arena where U.S. tech
companies fight their antitrust battles., 63 This, of course, is a far cry
from the conventional picture of stodgy European bureaucracy and
protectionism that dominant players wish to paint.
separate competition law at any one time from the political and historical framework in which it
is set up.").
59. See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2004 E.C.R. 11-4463, 2 ("On
10 December 1998, Sun Microsystems, Inc., a company established in California (United States
of America) ... lodged a complaint with the Commission.").
60. See, e.g., Parloff, supra note 10, at ("Failing to entice FTC intervention, McCoy
[AMD's Executive Vice President for Legal Affairs] then brought his grievances to the
European Commission competition authorities."); Mary Jacoby et al., Intel Could Face EU
Antitrust Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at A3 ("Intel competitor Advanced Micro Devices
Inc. of the U.S. has told [European] regulators that its bigger rival [Intel] has unfairly abused its
position as the world's dominant supplier of computer chips to muscle AMD out of new
markets.").
61. See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 32, at 223.
62. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 7 ("Microsoft's adversaries have joined together under
the banner of the European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS), an industry group
whose members include Adobe Systems (ADBE), IBM (IBM), Nokia (NOK), Oracle (ORCL),
Real Networks (RNWK), Red Hat (RHAT), and Sun Microsystems (SUNW)."); Paul Meller, In
Europe, Microsoft Faces A New Antitrust Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at C4.
63. Ewing, supra note 7.
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The next myth - that of bad economics - is more convoluted,
but equally wrong. The central claim is that Article 82 is out of touch
with modem economics. The standard critique suggests that "not only
the Commission but also the Community courts have too easily
condemned practices because they were presumed to lead to
foreclosure of competitors. The prohibition has been applied without
due regard for business justification. In short, the application of the
Article lacks an economic-based approach., 64 The argument then
suggests that Article 82 focuses neither on "consumer welfare" 65 nor
"efficiency. 66 EU law, it is claimed, should strive toward "catching
up',67 to the US; after all, "the goal of the U.S. antitrust law is the
maximization of consumer welfare, while the EC protects competition
by protecting competitors.' 68 At one level, these assertions are very
alluring. Who, after all, can disagree with reassuring terms like
"efficiency" and "consumer welfare"?
Yet this rhetoric is strikingly misleading. The lionized U.S.
approach does not reflect the rich history of antitrust regulation in
America, but only that of a particular brand of antitrust theory
championed eloquently by the so-called "Chicago School" that
"emphasizes the role of market forces and is generally reluctant to
attribute an important role to competition policy. '69 Terms like
64. Piet Jan Slot, A View from the Mountain: 40 Years of Developments in EC
Competition Law, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 443, 462 (2004) (emphasis in original). See also
Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 12-13 ("First, dominance is determined, and then the practice is
assessed mainly on the basis of its form, rather than its economic effects. In other words, there is
an implicit assumption that any practice that is undertaken by a dominant firm and that is not a
'normal' competitive action has the effect of distorting competition."); Roeller & Stehmann,
supra note 11, at 287.
65. See, e.g., Jordi Gual et al., Report by the Economic Advisory Group for Competition
Policy (EAGCP): An Economic Approach to Article 82, (July 2005), available at
ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/studies/eagcpjuly_2 l05.pdf ("An economic
approach to Article 82 focuses on improved consumer welfare.").
66. See, e.g., Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 48, at 513 ("The underlying assumptions of
EU competition law do not make efficiency the sole, or even principal, criterion.").
67. Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 18.
68. Eric S. Hochstadt, Note, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 295-96 (2002). See also Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 735
("Americans typically see the European competition law as concerned with the protection of
competitors from the rigors of competition."); Gitter, supra note 32, at 298; Slot, supra note 64,
at 462; Justin O'Dell, Note, Trouble Abroad: Microsoft's Antitrust Problems Under the Law of
the European Union, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 138 (2001).
69. Slot, supra note 64, at 445. See also Hochstadt, supra note 68, at 325. At least some
of today's regulators seem not to question the Chicago School's approach. For example, the
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Deborah Platt Majoras, has recently written
that "[w]hile we have had great success in achieving widespread adoption of Aaron Director's
[the intellectual father of the Chicago School] reliance on free market principles as the surest
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"efficiency" and "consumer welfare" come directly from the Chicago
School's playbook. As linguistically creative as the Chicago School
might be, these terms reflect facile assumptions and archaic
economics.
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, the Chicago School's
approach is riddled with glaring inconsistencies. To begin with, the
words "consumer welfare" are disingenuously defined to mean
overall allocative efficiency.7°
As Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan amusingly describe:
[T]he Chicago School defines competition in terms of efficiency;
defines efficiency as the absence of inefficiency; defines
inefficiency in terms of artificial output restraint; and thus
concludes that any activity that does not demonstrably limit output
is efficient and therefore procompetitive. Thus, it "proves" that
almost all business activity is efficient-a neat trick.
Allocative efficiency, in turn, is based on the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion which slights distributional concerns.72
This fallacy reflects just the beginning of the Chicago School's
problems. The approach conveniently ignores the legislative history
of the antitrust laws and assumes markets are contestable.73 It ignores
advances in the economics of industrial organization that have
occurred over the past three decades, including an understanding of
scale, transaction costs, dynamic analysis and core theory.74 The
way to maximize consumer welfare, we apparently cannot take this reliance for granted."
Deborah Platt Majoras, Reflections on the Evolution of European Community Competition
Policy Under Commissioner Monti, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 251, 256 (2005).
70. See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 745, 749-55 (2004). See also
Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are
We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936, 959 (1987) ("[T]he
producer-plus-consumer-welfare paradigm presses the analyst to think only in terms of
aggregate outcomes or wealth of the nation. But this concept is static and outcome-oriented,
while the antitrust laws are dynamic and process-oriented. They protect not an outcome, but a
process-competition."). Some observers even define "competition" in terms of allocative
efficiency. See, e.g., Kolasky, What Is Competition?, supra note 9, at 35 ("[C]ompetition is the
process by which market forces operate freely to assure that society's scarce resources are
employed as efficiently as possible to maximize total economic welfare.") (emphasis in original).
71. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 70, at 959.
72. See Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1325, 1330-34 (2006). As
two commentators observe with some understatement, "there is ambiguity in the meaning of a
'consumer welfare' or 'efficiency' standard." Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 769.
73. See Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 70, at 755-60. See also Jebsen & Stevens,
supra note 48, at 456 (discussing the assumptions undergirding the Chicago School's approach).
74. See Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 70, at 762-75. Unfortunately, these new
learnings have had precious little impact. See, e.g., Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 10
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Chicago School's bromides are especially dangerous in so-called new
economy industries where network effects, path dependence, and
overly expansive intellectual property rights can combine to entrench
monopolies and thwart innovation. As Eleanor Fox aptly puts it,
"[tihe 1980s victory of the Chicago School was more a victory of
economic libertarianism and political conservatism than of
maximization of a microeconomic welfare function., 76 One should
thus be very wary of critiques of Article 82 based on attractive, but
disingenuously defined terms such as "consumer welfare" and
"efficiency." These terms have been misdefined and misapplied in a
rhetorically masterful way that unfortunately belies modem
economics.
One might even turn the tables on the critics and argue that
vigorous enforcement of anti-monopolization laws, as exemplified by
Article 82, actually represents more consumer-friendly economics
that the laissez-faire attitudes that have so enraptured U.S. antitrust in
recent decades. The central point is that Article 82 focuses on market
structure. 7 By contrast, contemporary U.S. doctrine seems to find
("However, the rise of post-Chicago has not affected the prevalence of the Chicago ground rules
for antitrust listed above.").
75. See Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 70, at 776-8 1. See also Reza Dibadj, Small
Firms, Speak Up Loudly for Innovation, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2005, at 5P.
Consider what might happen, for instance, to the global distribution of software development
firms if Article 82 remains a more potent weapon against dominant firms than an ineffectual
Section 2:
In such a scenario it is easy to see total U.S. software exports decline as
Microsoft's U.S. rivals weaken in the face of its increasing returns in the U.S.
market, while barriers to entry are lowered in Europe making it more likely that
competitors will thrive there. It is even foreseeable in such a situation that, so
long as Microsoft's operating systems are deemed both dominant and amenable
to essential facility analysis, U.S. software firms whose development efforts now
are exclusively US.-based would shift some portion of those development efforts
to a European base.
Harz, supra note 32, at 233-34 (emphasis added).
76. Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 379 (2002) [hereinafter Fox, What Is Harm to
Competition?].
77. See, e.g., Case T-219/99, British Airways PLC v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917,
306 ("The Commission recalls that Article 82 EC is aimed not only at practices which may
cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through
their impact on an effective competitive structure."); Fox, What Is Harm to Competition?, supra
note 76, at 375 ("[T]he European competition system turns at least as much on preserving
competitive structure and open market values as on prohibiting conduct because it has
exploitative outcomes."). As I have argued elsewhere, antitrust should focus on structure rather
than on nebulous concepts such as competitive versus anticompetitive intent. See Dibadj, Saving
Antitrust, supra note 70, at 819-23.
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monopolization only where there is a short-term reduction in output,
78
and the longer-term consequences on structure somehow magically
becomes irrelevant.79 The importance of market structure, however, is
a fundamental one, with significant pedigree in the economics of
industrial organization. °
Careful emphasis on structure also helps relieve the putative
tension between protecting consumers and competitors. As William
Kovacic notes, "[i]t misrepresents EC policy to say that these
[European] perspectives betray a basic decision to protect competitors
without regard to consumer interests. Rather, EC policy continues to
place more faith in structural criteria as predictors of future consumer
well-being." 81 After all, consumers generally prefer to have more
competitors rather than fewer - it is no coincidence, for example,
that consumer advocates tend to oppose mergers. 82  The European
emphasis on "rivalry" 83 - a concept with its roots in Ordo-
Liberalism 84 - therefore, might actually better protect consumers
than policies focused solely on allocative efficiency. In other words, a
market structured with many rivals may be more protective of
"consumer welfare" than a market that is simply efficient,8 5 assuming
78. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 70, at 959. Focusing simply on output is different
than focusing on structure:
Principally, U.S. antitrust law proscribes only that which artificially lowers
output and raises price (with a few exceptions); even a dominant firm has the
right to compete hard and may do so even if it excludes competitors. EC
competition law, among other things, protects small and middle-sized business
from unfair exclusion and has a broader sweep against abusive practices.
Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 32, at 12.
79. Cf Takahashi, supra note 7 ("The EU is more sensitive to the dynamic aspects of
competition and how certain of these contracting parties may hurt innovation and stop rivals
from competing." (quoting David Balto, former policy director at the FTC)).
80. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1-2 (MIT Press
1988). Rivalry is also essential to Adam Smith's famous "invisible hand." ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 345 (George Routledge
& Sons 1890) (1776). After all, this mechanism is predicated on the "perfect liberty" of
exchanges and "competitors of equal wealth and luxury." Id. at 43.
81. William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 863 (2001) [hereinafter
Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence].
82. As I have suggested elsewhere, a "consumer monopsony" standard might represent a
more attractive objective for antitrust policy than allocative efficiency. See Dibadj, Saving
Antitrust, supra note 70, at 814-19.
83. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 761 ("The European Union has appeared to
follow a competition policy best described as the preservation of rivalry.").
84. Ahlbom et al., supra note 11, at 27.
85. Cf HAWK, supra note 25, at 684 ("A more important distinction may lie in Article
86's [82's] greater emphasis on protection of consumers."); Bellamy, U.S. and the EU, supra
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arguendo that efficiency can even be defined meaningfully.8 6 It is
important to remember that the portrayal of "efficiency" as an
American standard is only a recent phenomenon inspired by the
Chicago School. Up until the 1970s, American antitrust law
appreciated the importance of rivalry.87
As Daniel Gifford and Robert Kudrle observe, "the present
divergence between American and European approaches to
competition law can be seen largely as the result of the break up of an
earlier similarity. That earlier similarity dissolved when American
courts, scholars and practitioners adopted the Chicago school
approach in the mid-to-late 1970s. ''88 Indeed,
It]he European Union's treatment of exclusionary practices is
sympathetic with the one theme of the 1960s-1970s' American
jurisprudence that had a lasting resonance. That is: Competition
laws protect the competitive structure and dynamic of the market.
They protect openness of and access to markets, and the right of
market actors not to be fenced out by dominant firm strategies that
are not based on competitive merits.
89
It is amusing that even some of laissez-faire's most eloquent
proponents believe in the importance of rivalry when dealing with
cartels, but not with dominant firms.
90
This critique of the so-called "economic" approach will likely be
subject to two sophisticated criticisms. One is institutional; the other,
theoretical. The first is that one implication of vigorous anti-
monopolization laws is that "an undertaking enjoying a dominant
position is under a special responsibility not to engage in conduct that
note 46, at 18 ("[I1f we are to have large multi-national firms, adapted to a single market
throughout the European Community, and the economies of scale this will bring, then the 'quid
pro quo' is some protection for the consumer, and for the smaller firms, through the rules on
competition."); Gal, supra note 27, at 354 ("EC law also rests on a fairness argument, but one
that focuses on consumers rather than on producers.").
86. See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 70, at 959. See also supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
87. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 741-46.
88. Id. at 746. See also Fox, Monopolization and Dominance, supra note 4, at 983 ("[A]t
the time of the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, the Supreme Court of the United States was
applying antitrust law to protect the viability of small and middle-sized businesses, to preserve
the freedom of action of independent business people, and to disperse economic and political
power.").
89. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition?, supra note 76, at 392 (emphasis added).
90. See, e g., Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST
L.J. 693, 693 (2000) ("Collaboration between competitors, whether aimed at stifling some
aspect of rivalry, such as fixing prices, or ending competition entirely via merger, is the
lifeblood of antitrust.").
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may distort competition '  - smacks of regulation. 92 As William
Kovacic observes:
The design and implementation of remedies in abuse of dominance
cases confront courts with challenges for which judicial bodies
historically have been ill suited. Implementing some forms of
conduct remedies, such as mandatory access requirements and
nondiscrimination obligations, can require extensive continuing
oversight. The requisite oversight functions can entail regulatory
tasks that historically have been vested in regulatory commissions
with more suitable institutional features (including a large
permanent staff and superior ability to collect and evaluate relevant
information).
93
Critics lament, for instance that "the tag of 'dominance' in
Europe has often led to various kinds of essentially regulatory control,
severely constraining a firm's pursuit of profit in a way that contrasts
with American practice," 94 or that "Article 86 [82] has developed in a
way that leaves the Commission as a kind of regulatory agency. 9 5 As
I have argued in detail elsewhere, however, antitrust is nothing but
economic regulation. As such, administrative agencies - not
generalist courts - must play the frontline role in enforcing antitrust
laws.96 The fact that European competition law might better reflect
regulatory conceptions is therefore a strength, not a weakness.97
91. Microsoft Decision, supra note 6, 542. See also Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh
Foods Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 4653, 158 ("Consequently, although a finding that an
undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination, it means that, irrespective of
the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special
responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common
market."); Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 12.
92. See, e.g., Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 579 ("[I]n the European Union it appears
that the competition regime is more regulatory in tone.., based on the notion of 'special
responsibility' between a dominant party and its competitors .... "); Jebsen & Stevens, supra
note 48, at 488.
93. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies, supra note 27, at 1317. See also Slot, supra
note 64, at 454 ("On a practical level it may be questioned whether the Commission, or national
competition authorities for that matter, are equipped to assume day-to-day controls. Such
controls would change the function of competition authorities into regulatory agencies.").
94. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 739.
95. Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 48, at 448. See also O'Dell, supra note 68, at 118.
96. See Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 70, at 802-10. As Kovacic himself
acknowledges:
In theory, an expeditious, expert administrative process would seem to offer
considerable advantages over litigation of abuse of dominance cases in the
district court. ... If the existing quality of relevant institutions, both judicial and
administrative, cannot be surpassed, the possibilities for using antitrust doctrine
to do more than impose modest conduct remedies will be severely limited,
especially for high technology sectors.
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The second criticism is more theoretical than institutional. It
suggests that protecting consumers necessarily implicates
distributional concerns, something which antitrust law should not
concern itself with. After all, "[i]n the eyes of many North American
economists and antitrust thinkers, capturing a fair share of economic
surplus for consumers is not necessarily a job for antitrust; rather, the
job of antitrust is to promote maximum efficiency and reduce
deadweight loss. ' ' 98 One easy response to this assertion is that it is
simply irrelevant. After all, antitrust law is all about protecting
consumers - whether or not this implicates distributional goals is
beside the point. Another, more nuanced, rejoinder is that antitrust
should be viewed as a regulatory tool precisely because it necessarily
implicates distributional concerns. Both attacks dissolve provided one
is willing to recognize that antitrust implicates equity. The
institutional implication of this reality is that antitrust should be
viewed holistically as a form of regulation designed to protect
consumers.
Beginning in the 1970s and 80s, the Chicago School successfully
shifted attention from these vital goals, sapping antitrust of its energy.
As scholars have pointed out, this effort reflects an "'anti-antitrust'
perspective," 99 a "reductionist paradigm"'0 0 that "in the name of law
and economics, has waged ideological warfare, assaulting antitrust
itself."' 0 1 In the end, the idea that meaningful enforcement of anti-
monopolization laws reflects poor economics is driven by facile
assumptions fueling a normative agenda - not economics.,0 2 The
Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies, supra note 27, at 1318. Some commentators suggest
that the institutional differences between American and European competition law have led to a
preference for the efficiency standard in the U.S. and the rivalry standard in Europe, given that
generalist judges might prefer the former and expert agencies the latter. See, e.g., Gifford &
Kudrle, supra note 14, at 754; Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence, supra note 81, at 852;
William J. Kolasky, Mario Monti 's Legacy. A U.S. Perspective, I COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L
155, 167 (2005) [hereinafter Kolasky, Monti's Legacy]. For a discussion of similar institutional
issues, see Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, supra note 70, at 840-60.
97. Cf Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 32, at 17 n.84 ("EU abuse of dominance
law is more regulatory than U.S. law, which permits greater freedom of action, even by
dominant firms, e.g., in cutting off distributors, charging very low prices, and entering exclusive
contracts.").
98. Kobak, supra note 47, at 353.
99. Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 1749, 1769 (1995).
100. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 70, at 945.
101. Id. at 957.
102. See, e.g., Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and EU Positions on the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
825, 834 (1999) ("[T]he influence of the so-called 'Chicago School' in U.S. law has resulted in
various assumptions that migrate fears of the concentration of monopoly power, suggesting that
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concern, however, is fundamental: is it not better "to let the chances




Perhaps because these deep problems have not been brought to
the fore, in recent months Europe has begun to fall under the spell of
laissez-faire rhetoric as it explores reinterpreting Article 82 to mimic
Section 2.104 In 2005, the European Commission's Directorate-
General Competition (DG-Comp) issued a Discussion Paper on
Article 82105 that reads oddly like something the Chicago School
would have written in the 1970s. For instance, the paper argues that
"[t]he Community competition rules protect competition on the
market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an
efficient allocation of resources"' 0 6 and that "it is competition, and not
competitors as such, that is to be protected.'
0 7
In a recent and well-publicized speech, Neelie Kroes, the
Commissioner responsible for Competition Policy similarly speaks of
an approach focused on so-called "consumer welfare," not fairness:
I am aware that it is often suggested that-unlike Section 2 of the
Sherman Act-Article 82 is intrinsically concerned with "fairness"
and therefore not focused primarily on consumer welfare. As far as
I am concerned, I think that competition policy evolves as our
understanding of economics evolves. In days gone by, "fairness"
played a prominent role in Section 2 enforcement in a way that is
no longer the case. I don't see why a similar development could
not take place in Europe. 1
08
most markets are indeed competitive .... ); Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra note 32, at 10.
To be sure, the analysis of monopolization can often pose difficult questions. See, e.g., Facey &
Assaf, supra note 17, at 586. Tossing around misleading terms such as "consumer welfare" and
"efficiency," however, provides little engagement.
103. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition?, supra note 76, at 391.
104. Cf Niels & Kate, supra note 16, at 17 ("[lI]t should be noted that overall EC
competition law has been moving much closer toward U.S. antitrust."). For a discussion of
recent trends in the EU's strategy, see generally Roeller & Stehmann, supra note 11.
105. See DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty
to Exclusionary Abuses (Dec. 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commcompetition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf.
106. ld 88. Of course, neither "consumer welfare" nor "efficient" is defined.
107. Id. 54.
108. Neelie Kroes, Member, European Comm'n, Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review
of Article 82, Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 3 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comn/competition/speeches/index_2005.htm. See also Kolasky, Monti's
Legacy, supra note 96, at 162 ("There has also been salutary recognition by senior Commission
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Similarly, a group of European economists argues that Article 82
analysis should shift to an "effects-based approach [where] the focus
is on the use of well-established economic analysis."' 10 9 There is even
evidence from the European courts that they are less interested in
policing dominant firms - as witnessed most prominently by the
Bronner case which limited application of the essential facilities
doctrine."
0
Whether and how such currents will overwhelm the historic and
contextual realities discussed in Section II that undergrid a robust
Article 82111 cannot be predicted.' 2 But the trend is worrisome,
especially because it rests on the pseudo-economics that Section II
has tried to debunk." 1
3
The debate that is taking place in Europe, however, does at least
provide an opportunity of opportunity to ask three basic sets of
questions. First, what commercial interests desire a weakening of
officials of the need to clarify the Commission's policy on the application of Article 82 ....");
Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 528 ("[T]he European Union may be beginning to move
towards the U.S. approach by acknowledging that consumer welfare is the goal of competition
law.").
109. Gual et al., supra note 65, at 4.
110. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag Gmbh & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, 47. Bronner "restricts the scope of
the essential facilities doctrine by limiting its application to situations in which the owner of a
facility holds more than a dominant position. Bronner requires that a facility be indispensable."
Evrard, supra note 32, at 491. The upshot is that "the criteria set forth by Bronner move the
concept of abuse of dominant position towards that of monopolization as developed in Section 2
of the Sherman Act." Id. at 520. See also Geradin, supra note 32.
111. Cf Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 728 ("The prospect of convergence is, we
believe, constrained by history, ideology, politics and legal tradition.").
112. For instance, perhaps the national courts will resist weakening Article 82. As Michal
Gal argues in the context of pricing:
Under the regulatory system of the EC, national competition authorities may
generally apply national competition laws-which largely follow the EC laws-
in cases that involve an anticompetitive conduct that affects the member state.
The formal legal EC rule, which still prohibits excessive pricing, enables national
authorities and courts to take a different stance with regard to its practical
application. As a result, the rule against excessive pricing may be awakened from
its dormant state. In fact, some authorities have adopted a much more
interventionist approach than the Commission.
Gal, supra note 27, at 378.
113. Even those who support weakening Article 82 acknowledge the problems their
position creates. See, e.g., Editorial, A Competition Policy Overdue for Review, supra note 12
("New guidelines [on Article 82] would have to suggest how the short-term benefits to
consumers of allowing an efficient company to dominate less efficient competitors could be
balanced against the longer-term harm if those competitors were driven out of the market.").
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abuse of dominant position doctrine? 1 4  Might these interests
influence competition authorities? As William Kovacic observes:
Antitrust agencies do not operate in a political vacuum. When they
challenge significant economic interests, they must be prepared to
withstand close scrutiny from legislators and other public officials
to whom the dominant firm complains about the government's
decision to prosecute. As the government pursues more ambitious
remedial ends, the intensity of political opposition is likely to
increase.
115
Similarly, how much faith should we place in research funded by
dominant firms that, unsurprisingly, argue against the dangers of
monopoly?'
1 6
Second, is there something we in the U.S. might learn from
Article 82? As Judge Diane Wood has written in the context of
competition law more generally:
Even if it turns out that there is never any formal globalization of
antitrust law, the mere fact that an entity as large as the European
Union is soon to be has chosen a slightly different path raises
important questions for both scholars and practitioners in the area.
Are the principles we now regard as essential for a soundly based
antitrust law universal? Does the social science of economics
describe accurately all human behavior, in all countries, at all
times? Is a country's history unimportant when we consider what
kind of competition law it needs?'
1
114. To state the obvious, debilitating Article 82 would be good for dominant firms. As
one article in the financial press notes:
Lawyers said the changes would require much greater use of economic
data and analysis and would probably mean that some categories of abuse would
no longer be pursued by the European Commission.
"It will be much more difficult and time-consuming to establish that a
company has abused its dominant position," said Chris Thomas, a partner at
Lovells in Brussels. "This is fundamentally good news for powerful companies,
because it will be exceptionally difficult for their rivals to demonstrate an abuse,"
he added.
Tobias Buck, Kroes Seeks Regime That Benefits Consumer, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at 32.
115. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies, supra note 27, at 1316.
116. See, e.g., David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73 n.t (2005) ("We
thank... Microsoft and Visa for research funding."). The authors determine that "[e]conomics
has not identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for any unilateral practice to be
anticompetitive. But it has done a better job at determining the necessary conditions that can be
used to screen out practices that could not be anticompetitive." Id. at 86. While one might
disagree with their conclusions, the authors are, of course, to be praised for disclosing the
sources of their funding.
117. Wood, U.S. Antitrust Laws, supra note 10, at 280-81.
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Notwithstanding the current push to refashion Article 82 into
Section 2, Wood's questions are especially relevant given that other
countries are adopting the European rather than the U.S. model for
their own competition laws.' 18 Yet the concept of abuse of dominance
remains largely alien to U.S. discourse. 1 9 If the European approach to
monopoly were better understood, it would perhaps be less easy to
dismiss it using facile bromides like "consumer welfare,"
"efficiency," and "competition." Thus a more substantive dialogue
might begin.
Third, and most fundamentally, can Article 82 provide a window
into a broader debate about what antitrust law should be? Thanks to
the Chicago School and its acolytes, antitrust law in the U.S. has
shriveled. 20 The current ethos seems to have lost sight of the fact that
the "primary goal of the [Sherman Act] was premised upon a political
judgment that decentralized market power was essential to a free
society.' 12 1 As Rudolph Peritz eloquently argues in his history of
competition policy, the broader danger is that antitrust will be isolated
from such political judgments:
In the last two decades, the political sphere has come to be
identified as an economic domain-most zealously so under the
influence of Chicago School economist George Stigler's market
metaphor for government regulation and the Public Choice school
that has reified Stigler's metaphor. Thus, the logic of unification
produces one domain-whether political or economic-rather than
the first logic's bipolar opposition. But the purity produced by the
logic of unification comes at a high price: Lost in the collapse is
one sphere's ethical principles and social goals. For example,
equality may give way to liberty, as happened in the Lochner era,
or equitable concerns may yield to wealth maximization .... In
118. See, e.g., Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 58, at 1799 ("In any
event, the European Union is winning the competition. More nations are finding the E.U. model,
in contrast to the U.S. model, congenial to their economies and polities.").
119. See, e.g., Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 14, at 738 ("We were unable to find a single
U.S. industrial organization textbook account that uses [dominance] regularly or even explores
the term as it is used in Europe.").
120. Cf Minda, supra note 99, at 1755 ("As a legal specialty, antitrust law peaked during
the Warren Court era and has steadily declined ever since.").
121. Id. This attitude persisted more or less until the 1970s:
In the 1960s, U.S. antitrust law was synergistic with civil rights law; it protected
the underdog. It protected the freedom of independent traders to sell where and to
whom they chose, and protected their right not to be fenced out of any significant
market by the use of leverage. It valued market governance by impersonal forces,
rather than by dominant firms.
Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 58, at 1798.
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both theoretical and practical terms, competition policy comes to
reflect only one rhetoric, one vision of society, untempered by its
historical counterweight, because the unifying logic of collapsing
domains either ignores ethical and teleological differences between
economic and political realms or understands them as closed to
negotiation. 122
The current fashion in antitrust has been simply to ignore these
concerns. 12 3 But if antitrust law is to continue to have substance rather
than become merely a convenient tool of antiquated laissez-faire
economics, it must squarely confront the dangers of monopoly rather
than hide behind facile and misleading slogans like "consumer
welfare" and "efficiency.' 24 The current controversy surrounding
Article 82 provides an excellent opportunity to debate the first
principles of antitrust more generally. If one believes in antitrust law
as something more than pretty rhetoric, then crafting Article 82 to
mimic the non-enforcement of Section 2 is precisely the wrong
approach. Paradoxically, Article 82 is actually closer to original spirit
of antitrust than Section 2.
V. CONCLUSION
Arguing about transnational antitrust has become a small cottage
industry. Extraterritoriality has of course been the staple, 125 but it is
increasingly supplemented with interesting discussions on topics such
as the use of private rights of action1 26 and the desirability of
122. RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 302 (Oxford University Press 1996) (emphasis added). Cf Fox & Sullivan,
supra note 70, at 944 ("[A]ntitrust traditionally had two central concerns. The first was
political---distrust of bigness and of fewness of competitors as well as a policy preference for
diversity and opportunity for the unestablished. The second was socioeconomic, especially as
seen from the vantage point of the small businessperson and the consumer").
123. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
124. Cf Minda, supra note 99, at 1759 ("The loss of belief in antitrust's historical role in
regulating monopoly power must be recovered if antitrust is to remain politically active in the
next century.").
125. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S.
Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2005); Sam Foster Halabi, The
"Comity" of Empagran: The Supreme Court Decides that Foreign Competition Regulation
Limits American Antitrust Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 279
(2005); Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Empagram: What Next?, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 1419
(2005).
126. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of
Competition Law: A Historical Perspective on the Expansion of Private Antitrust Enforcement,
23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 474 (2005); Salil K. Mehra, More is Less: A Law-and-Economics
Approach to the International Scope of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 47
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establishing international antitrust enforcement mechanisms. 127
Monopolization, however, remains understudied. This state of affairs
is especially curious, given that the treatment of dominant firms
reveals a striking area of transatlantic divergence.1
8
To the extent that writers engage the monopolization issue, the
overwhelming mass of commentary suggests that Section 2 has got it
right and Article 82 has got it wrong. Critics disingenuously portray
abuse of dominance doctrine as an imposition by European
bureaucrats upon American innovators. Or worse yet, they paint
attempts at cabining monopoly as somehow based on faulty economic
analysis. This article has tried to show that these arguments are based
on a series of reassuring bromides that, while rhetorically elegant,
ultimately do not survive critical inquiry. In fact, the prevailing
wisdom may have it exactly backward: current interpretation of
Section 2 has more to learn from Article 82 than the other way
around. Analysis of Article 82's history, purpose and context suggests
that it is emblematic of the useful role competition laws can play as
regulatory tools.
The time is especially ripe to begin this conversation, as recent
developments in Europe suggest that Article 82 may yet come to
mimic Section 2. While the trend is troublesome, the emerging debate
provides an opportunity to focus not only on whether or not curbing
monopoly is a worthy policy objective, but more generally on
whether antitrust regulation has lost its way.
(2004); Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World.- Private Enforcement in
a Global Market, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 409 (2004).
127. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHi. L. REV. 309
(2005); Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International
Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (2005); John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of
InternationalAntitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 549 (2003).
128. Cf Facey & Assaf, supra note 17, at 581 ("[l]n the area of monopolization,
convergence and enforcement cooperation are less settled and have received much less
attention .... ).
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